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Abstract—It is unrealistic to assume that all nodes in an
ad hoc wireless network would be willing to participate in
cooperative communication, especially if their desired Quality-of-
Service (QoS) is achievable via direct transmission. An incentive-
based auction mechanism is presented to induce cooperative
behavior in wireless networks with emphasis on users with
asymmetrical channel fading conditions. A single-object second-
price auction is studied for cooperative partner selection in single-
carrier networks. In addition, a multiple-object bundled auction
is analyzed for the selection of multiple simultaneous partners in a
cooperative orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)
setting. For both cases, we characterize equilibrium outage
probability performance, seller revenue, and feedback bounds.
The auction-based partner selection allows winning bidders to
achieve their desired QoS while compensating the seller who
assists them. At the local level sellers aim for revenue maximiza-
tion, while connections are drawn to min-max fairness at the
network level. The proposed strategies for partner selection in
self-configuring cooperative wireless networks are shown to be
robust under conditions of uncertainty in the number of users
requesting cooperation, as well as minimal topology and channel
link information available to individual users.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE usage of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)systems for enhancing achievable data rates in wire-
less systems by means of spatial diversity has been a topic
of interest over the last decade [1]. Spatial diversity with
multiple antennas may be difficult to implement in space
and power-constrained mobile terminals, which has led to
the recent development of cooperative diversity [2]–[5]. In
brief, cooperative diversity is achieved when the data of a
user is transmitted by its cooperating partners and vice-versa,
which emulates a multi-antenna transmission scheme. This
cooperation allows either an increase in achievable rates, a
decrease in net power consumption, or an improved decoding
performance due to diversity.
Conventional cooperation protocols are usually reciprocal,
i.e., when cooperation between two users is mutually beneficial
in terms of increased throughput or energy efficiency. For
this purpose, amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperation involves
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the partner forwarding a scaled version of its received signal
to the final destination; decode-and-forward (DF) cooperation
requires the partner to decode and then retransmit its estimate
of the received information [2]–[4], and coded cooperation
entails the alternate transmission of each other’s incremental
redundancy to a common destination [6]–[9]. Cooperative
protocols are called full-duplex if partners transmit and receive
information simultaneously over the same frequency, and half-
duplex if partners are constrained to transmit and receive in
channels that are orthogonal in time, frequency, or spreading
code. While the AF and DF protocols offer different diversity
and bit error benefits depending upon the quality of the inter-
user channel, we adopt the full-duplex DF technique as the
underlying relaying scheme since we assume that the inter-
user channel is statistically better than the direct channels.
The selection of appropriate cooperative partners has been
based largely on the optimization of physical layer parameters,
primarily by a central controller. Examples include using a
maximum received SNR criterion in [9], a centralized utility
maximization method in [10], distributed selection using a
fixed-priority list protocol in [11], maximum harmonic mean
of source-relay and relay-destination channel gains in [12], and
transmit power-minimizing partner/subcarrier assignment in
[13], [14]. However, the majority of partner-selection research
has been relay-oriented in nature, meaning the entire network
is searched for optimal partners, and it is assumed that every
user is involved in cooperative transmission over the network
lifetime. Another common assumption is that data sources
have ready access to fixed relays in the network that do not
have any information of their own to transmit.
In practice, even in small networks the rapidly changing
inter-user channels, user asynchronicity, diverse Quality-of-
Service (QoS) requirements, user mobility, and users entering
and leaving randomly make it difficult for users to gather
enough information to even decide if cooperation is beneficial.
More importantly, self-interested users may not always want
to voluntarily engage in cooperation, particularly with weaker
users in asymmetric fading conditions. Therefore, in this paper
we make the more realistic assumption that users seek relaying
assistance only if they are unable to achieve a desired QoS on
their own. We then develop an auction-theoretic cooperative
partner selection (ACOPS) scheme by modeling users seeking
cooperation as bidders and potential helpers as sellers. The
use of auctions provides an incentive for stronger users to
share their resources based on monetary incentives. Previous
applications of microeconomics to wireless networks include
the use of pricing functions for regulation of power control,
packet forwarding, and spectrum allocation in cognitive net-
2works [15]–[17].
The characteristics of competition and collaboration in
cooperative networks naturally invite analyses based on game
theory [18], [19]. Auction-theoretic algorithms (a subset of
game theory) have been proposed in [20] for centralized
downlink power allocation in code-division multiple-access
systems, in [21] for downlink bandwidth allocation in wireless
fading channels, in [22] for iterative power allocation by relays
operating with a half-duplex AF protocol, and [23] for band-
width allocation on an OFDMA downlink. This paper focuses
on the decentralized cooperative partner selection on the uplink
of cellular or ad hoc networks using a second-price auction
structure, as compared to the downlink resource allocation in
the previous work mentioned above. The proposed auction
approach is an example of so-called competitive fairness,
since the users compete to decide the recipient of cooperative
resources. In comparison, the application of pricing functions
as in [15]–[16] imposes a central utility function upon all
users, which has been criticized as artificial fairness [21].
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We characterize best-reply strategies and seller revenue
for the single-stage second-price sealed-bid auction in
which the exact number of competitors is unknown for
each bidder, and a single user is assisted over one network
realization. We then prove the existence and uniqueness
of the symmetric Nash equilibria for the auction game
under consideration. Finally, we calculate the probability
of outage and signaling overhead bounds in the context
of single-partner cooperative communications over flat-
fading channels.
• We show that selling all objects together in a one-time
multiple-object auction [24] for multiple cooperative part-
ner selection is preferable to holding sequential single-
object auctions. We characterize revenue, probability of
outage, and signaling overhead for a bundled multiple-
object auction. This selection scheme is examined in
the context of cooperative orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) communications [25]–[27] over
frequency-selective fading channels.
• Finally, we develop a complete framework for the ap-
plication of the novel results obtained above to a co-
operative communication network. The performance of
the proposed algorithms is then compared with existing
partner selection, fully centralized partner allocation, and
no cooperation schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the cooperative communication system
framework. Section III describes the auction-theoretic model
used in subsequent sections. Section IV introduces the single-
stage second-price auction for the selection of a single partner
per cooperative transmission. Section V presents a multiple-
object bundle auction for multiple-partner selection in mul-
ticarrier systems, followed by a discussion on extensions to
sequential auction games and multi-hop relaying in Section VI.
Finally, simulation results are presented in Section VII, and
Section VIII concludes the paper.
Notation: Random variables are represented in italics, e.g.,
Y, while their realizations are in lower-case, y. Vectors are
in boldface, v. Sets are denoted by mathematical script, A.
The Cartesian product is denoted by ×, convolution by ∗, the
expectation operation by E [·], and the Laplace transform by
L{·}.
II. COOPERATIVE SYSTEM MODEL
The wireless network under consideration consists of single-
antenna users self-grouped according to geographical prox-
imity. User antennas are assumed to be omni-directional to
facilitate cooperative communications. Therefore, a group for
a particular user may be approximated as a circle with radius
limited by the range up to which signals can be transmitted
and received with neighboring users, unlike [11] where users
must be able to receive signals from all other users.
We focus on a cellular network with a single destination,
and assume that the users may be grouped into two categories
based upon their uplink channel condition. Users that are
unable to achieve a desired transmission rate due to poor
channel quality to the destination or BS are termed weak users,
and users possessing favorable channels to the BS are referred
to as potential helpers or sellers in the remainder of this paper.
In principle, the proposed scheme is applicable to a broad
class of networks, for example, ad hoc wireless networks with
differing source-destination pairs as compared to a fixed BS
in cellular systems.
The proposed ACOPS model makes the following major
assumptions:
(A1) Each user is assumed to have knowledge only of the
inter-user link CSI between itself and the potential helper
within its group, and the CSI of its direct link to the BS,
(A2) Weak users and helpers are both unaware of the exact
number of neighboring weak users and their channel
conditions,
(A3) A single potential helper (seller) exists per group,
(A4) Only a single (one-shot) cooperation interval is ana-
lyzed; and all cooperative communications are carried
out over a single hop.
Assumptions (A1)-(A2) highlight the lack of complete infor-
mation in the proposed partner-selection scheme, while (A3)-
(A4) enable a simpler starting point for our investigation.
Extensions to (A3)-(A4) such as multiple potential helpers per
group and cooperation over multiple stages are discussed in
Section VI. In particular, Sec. VI describes the considerable
challenges that are introduced when examining a multi-stage
version of the auction game in realistic wireless networks with
dynamic user channels.
A. Cooperation over Flat-Fading Channels
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of all weak users in
a single group. All direct-to-BS links and inter-user links
between potential helpers and weak users within a group
are modeled using a combination of small-scale fading, path
loss, and shadowing [28, sec. 3.2]. The small-scale fading is
quasi-static Rayleigh fading in nature. For the single-antenna
user case, the channel capacity for a link with SNR γ and a
Gaussian input is
C (γ) = log2 (1 + γ) bits/s/Hz, (1)
3subject to an average transmit power constraint PT . The
instantaneous SNR of the link between users i and j at a
distance di,j can be represented as γi,j = Γi,j |hi,j |2, where
hi,j is the normalized complex Gaussian fading coefficient
with amplitude |hi,j |2 = (hi,j,c)2 + (hi,j,s)2, hi,j,c, hi,j,s ∼
N (0, 1/2) being normally distributed, and E
{
|hi,j |2
}
= 1.
Γi,j =
PT
N0W
GTGRsi,jd
−a
i,j is the average SNR of the link,
with transmit power PT , bandwidth W, transmit and receive
antenna gains GT , GR, log-normally distributed shadowing
component si,j , and path-loss exponent a, 2 ≤ a ≤ 4
typically. Complex additive white Gaussian noise with zero
mean and variance N0/2 per dimension is present at all
receiving terminals. The direct-to-BS links of the weak users
are assumed to be dominated by the large-scale fading effects
of shadowing and path loss, over an extended period of time.
Let Ri,BS denote the achievable direct-link transmission
rate without cooperation for the ith weak user. Assume the
desired transmission rate to be Di, Di > Ri,BS , which
indicates a shortfall of qi = Di − Ri,BS . User i then seeks
to approach the target rate Di by attempting to cooperate
with a potential helper in its vicinity, if any. Under Rayleigh
fading, γi,j is exponentially distributed with parameter 1/Γi,j .
Therefore, if we define the outage probability for a target rate
Di as the probability of Di exceeding the achievable link
capacity C (γ), i.e., Pout (Di) = Pr (C (γ) < Di), then from
(1) we can write the non-cooperative outage probability as
Pout (Di) =
2Di−1∫
0
1
Γi,j
exp
(
− γ
Γi,j
)
dγ
= 1− exp
(
−2
Di − 1
Γi,j
)
. (2)
The achievable total rate Ri for the ith weak user cooperating
with a single potential helper is [2]
Ri = Ri,PH + Ri,BS , (3)
where Ri,PH denotes the cooperative rate provided by the po-
tential helper to the ith weak user. For simulation purposes we
assume an idealized full-duplex decode-and-forward protocol
with perfect echo cancelation and synchronization, as well as
zero processing delay. If half-duplex cooperation is considered,
a suitable factor of 12 can be introduced in (3) to account for the
rate penalty incurred. The specific cooperative rate expressions
for AF and DF protocols with a half-duplex relaying constraint
have been derived in [4], and can be integrated into ACOPS
if so desired.
A weak user i that desires a higher uplink data rate
broadcasts its cooperative rate request qi, which is overheard
by neighboring users. Potential helpers who receive such
request(s) respond with the data rate Rc they are willing to
allocate for cooperative communication, Rc 6 C (γPH,BS).
The helper-user links are considered to be reciprocal; this
response allows the weak users to estimate the quality of their
link to the helper, fulfilling Assumption (A1).
B. Cooperation over Frequency-Selective Fading Channels
For a cooperative OFDM scenario, the wireless link between
users is modeled as a frequency-selective block-fading channel
with L delay paths or taps and an exponentially decaying
intensity profile. If the total bandwidth is divided into K˜
subchannels with uniform power allocation to decrease CSI
requirements, the total capacity is the sum of the rates of the
parallel subchannels as
C˜i,j
(
K˜
)
=
K˜−1∑
k=0
C
(
γki,j
)
=
K˜−1∑
k=0
log2
(
1 + γki,j
)
, (4)
where γki,j is the exponentially distributed SNR on subchannel
k between users i and j and implicitly depends on L. Our
cooperative OFDM model considers a single potential helper
with K˜ subchannels offered for cooperation to N weak users,
N ≤ K˜ since subchannels are not allowed to be shared
between users over one cooperative epoch.
BS/AP
P.H
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Potential
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i = 1
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i = 4
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2
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hg = G
2
3, 3, 3,PH PH PH
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Fig. 1. Cooperative wireless network with asymmetric link conditions for a
group with a single potential helper and N = 5 weak users.
An example of an asymmetric single-carrier cooperative
network is shown in Fig. 1, where a single potential helper
and N = 5 weak users are assumed to constitute a group.
All five weak users are assumed to be in outage and therefore
broadcast cooperative rate requests q1, . . . , q5. Four of the five
weak users, numbered as i = 1, 2, 3, and 4, possess a much
more favorable link to the potential helper compared to their
direct links to the BS, and therefore receive a response from
the potential helper which has a strong link to the BS, i.e.,
E |hPH,BS | ≫ E |hi,BS |. The feedback from the potential
helper enables the weak users to estimate the quality of their
user-to-helper link γi,PH . The fifth weak user (i = 5), in Fig.
1 has unfavorable channels to both the BS and the potential
helper. Therefore it may not receive a response from the
potential helper at all, or based upon the response, it perceives
the poor quality of its user-to-helper link and abstains from
cooperation.
III. AUCTION-THEORETIC BACKGROUND
A. Auction as a Game
Auctions can be modeled as games of incomplete informa-
tion [24],[29]. A game Ω consists of (i) a set of N players,
(ii) for each player i ∈ N , a nonempty set of actions Si
4and a payoff function Πi. Therefore, an auction game with
player set N can be compactly represented in strategic form
as Ω = [N ,Si,Πi]i∈N .
In a sealed-bid auction, bids are submitted confidentially
and are known only to the seller. A first-price sealed-bid
auction awards the object to the highest bidder who pays his
bid, whereas a second-price auction awards the object to the
highest bidder who pays an amount equal to the second-highest
of all bids placed. In both formats, losing bidders do not pay
anything. It is shown in subsequent sections that the proposed
auction game strikes a balance between revenue maximization
at the seller level, and efficient allocation at the network level.
All auction-theoretic mechanisms in this paper conform to
standard auctions in the following ways: (1) the object(s) on
sale is always awarded to the highest bidder, (2) all bidders
are treated as anonymous entities, and (3) ties are broken by
random allotment of the object to one of the high bidders. Our
assumptions for ACOPS, such as user asynchronicity, uncer-
tainty about the number of bidders and private values signify
that we analyze auctions as games of incomplete information.
The relevance of objects, payoffs, bids, and winners for the
cooperative wireless network under consideration is explained
later in this section. Even though bids are broadcast and can
be overheard by competing bidders, the assumption of private
values still holds since bids already placed cannot be updated
within one contention interval, and it is shown in the next
section that the optimum bidding strategy is independent of
other bids. In other words, bids that have not yet been placed
are not influenced by overheard bids, and hence the auction is
equivalent to a sealed-bid format.
At user initiation, each user is provided with an equal
amount of virtual ‘money’ or tokens for the purpose of
resource contention.The proposed wireless network model has
a group of weak users willing to pay varying amounts of
‘money’ for higher degrees of Quality of Service (QoS),
and a group of potential helpers willing to receive monetary
compensation for sharing their resources and assisting such
users as envisioned in [2]. Revenue accumulated by helpers
can be used in turn for their own cooperative bids during
adverse link conditions in the future, since as stated before,
potential helpers are not fixed over time. It is in the best
interest of every potential helper to maximize its expected
revenue. Therefore, the proposed mechanism serves as an
incentive for advantaged users to participate in cooperation
over the network.
B. Contention Process
Fig. 2 depicts a time-scale showing the initiation of the
auction protocol during time TI , where the potential helper
is contacted by N weak users belonging to a group, all of
whom seek to benefit from cooperation with it. Based upon
the requested data rates qi and its own surplus data rate Rc
(Rc being the object on sale), the potential helper calculates
the number of users it can assist simultaneously. The auction
contention occurs if and only if (a) the number of cooperation
requests received by the potential helper is greater than or
equal to two, and (b) if Rc > 0, i.e., the helper’s own QoS
Initiation
by Helper
TI TB TCO
Duration of cooperationContention period
q2
q1
q3
b2
b1
b3
Feedforward from helper to weak users
Feedback from weak users to helper
RC
Winner
declared
Cooperation
requests from weak
users 2,4,3, and 1
Bids from weak
users 2,3,1
End of
cooperation
broadcast
Ignored cooperation
request from weak
user 5
q5
TI TB TCO (Duration of cooperation)
Contention period
q2
q1
q3
b2
b1
b3
RC
Winner(s)
declared
Cooperation
requests from
weak users 2,3,1
Bid vectors from
weak users 2,3,1
Initiation
by Helper
Subcarrier Partioning
Subcarrier bundle for partner 1
Subcarrier bundle for partner 3
Subcarrier bundle for partner 2
End of
cooperation
broadcast
(b)
(a)
q4
r = 3 partners for
the helper
Fig. 2. (a) Cooperative communication control structure for single-partner
selection using a single-stage auction with N = 4 weak users and Na = 3
bidders involved in the contention stage. Cooperation requests qi and bids bi
are received at different times by the helper due to asynchronous users. The
duration of cooperation denoted by TCO is limited by the channel coherence
time of the potential helper; since the helper itself is mobile it may not
always be in a more advantageous position with respect to the BS. Both
TI and TB are assumed to be fractions of TCO , i.e., TI ≈ TB << TCO .
(b) Cooperative OFDM communication control structure for multiple-partner
selection using a mixed-bundle multiple-object auction with Na = 3 bidders
involved in the contention stage.
is already satisfied. The contention process takes place during
interval TB , followed by cooperative communication between
the auction winner and the helper for time period TCO. Once
the bidding stage with a hard close time TB is over and
cooperative transmissions have commenced, the helper ignores
any cooperative requests received during time TCO. Since the
users are asynchronous, therefore cooperation requests and
bids are received at different times by the potential helper
within the initiation and contention periods, as seen in Fig. 2.
C. Bidder Private Information
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS
Xi Private value random variable for ith user
N Total number of weak users in a group
Na Number of actual bidders in a group
Rc Potential helper surplus rate for sale
qi i
th weak user rate request
bi Bid placed by bidder i
r Number of simultaneous partners
Y ki k
th bundle value for user i
ck Cardinality of bundle k
Table I lists the commonly used variables in this paper.
Let random variable Xi represent the value of the sale object
to user i, where each Xi is independently and identically
distributed with a continuous distribution function (cdf) FX
over support1 (−∞,∞). The private values Xi are considered
1Although negative private values seem unreasonable, we connect our
private value to a physical parameter, namely the difference of two SNRs
as explained in the next section.
5to be independent, and are therefore unaffected by knowledge
of values held by the other users.
Let Na be the number of actual bidders during contention
period TB, where Na ≤ N . The number of actual bidders
may be less than the total number of weak users N , due
to weak users with non-positive private values opting to not
bid, improvements in a weak user’s BS link quality γi,BS
after their cooperation request, or weak users moving out
of range into another group. More precisely, a weak user
proceeds to act as a bidder if it possesses a positive private
value xi > 0. The entry of new weak users in the group
during period TB will not change set N as they lack the
information required to place a bid. Bidder i estimates the
number of competitors to be Nˆa(i) ∈ Z+, based upon the
number of cooperation requests received by him/her. This
estimate Nˆa(i) is modeled as a Poisson random variable with
mean ζ = E [Na] = E
[
Nˆa
]
and standard deviation σ =
√
ζ,
i.e., Pr
(
Nˆa = a
)
= ζae−ζ
/
a!, where a ∈ Z+. Therefore, the
seller and all bidders are uncertain about the ex ante (i.e., a
priori) number of actual bidders during the contention period
TI , in contrast to the existing auction-theoretic applications,
such as [21]–[22]. We refer to user uncertainty about the
exact number of bidders as rival uncertainty. We then define
the (private value, rival estimate) 2-tuple of bidder i as type(
xi, Nˆa(i)
)
for a particular network realization, with xi ∈ R.
Let an Euclidean subspace Si be the strategy set of
continuous, real-valued monotonically increasing bidding
functions over the support of Xi for the ith bidder, with
higher bidding functions corresponding to more favorable
perceived private values. The joint strategy space for
all N users is then defined by the Cartesian product
S = S1 × S2 × . . . × SN . In addition, let vector b−i =
{b1 ∈ S1, . . . , bi−1 ∈ Si−1, bi+1 ∈ Si+1, . . . , bN ∈ SN}
denote bidding strategies for all N-1 other users excluding
bidder i. The reserve price of the potential helper is set to
zero for every object, i.e., the surplus data rate Rc holds no
value for the seller. Define the constant αi , qiRc , such that
1
αi
denotes the ratio of the offered cooperative rate to the
desired additional data rate of each user.
For any multi-user game, the payoff or profit function Πi
for user i represents the expected benefit or utility given a
specific strategy (bid in the case of an auction game). Every
bidder seeks to maximize its individual expected payoff, which
is termed as risk-neutral behavior in game-theory literature.
IV. SINGLE-PARTNER SELECTION
In this section, we assume that the surplus rate Rc of a
potential helper is sufficient to support a single weak user, i.e.,
a single partner, at a given time. This situation corresponds to
single-carrier AF/DF cooperation over a flat-fading channel, or
a coded cooperative system with two users. First, we examine
a single-stage game employing a second-price auction with N
weak users each facing an uncertain number of competitors.
The formulation of the private value for a bidder is an
interesting design problem in itself. Consider the following
two options out of the many possibilities: (a) Xi = γi,PH , or
(b) Xi = γi,PH/αi−γi,BS . Here, (a) would be equivalent to a
conventional partner selection strategy based upon maximizing
the instantaneous helper-user SNR as in [10], which is a
greedy or opportunistic approach. On the other hand, the
interpretation of (b) is more subtle. Theoretically, (b) is a
measure of bidder i’s marginal opportunity cost of not being
awarded cooperation [30]. The factor of 1αi represents the
utility perceived by the bidder; if Rc < qi, then the bidder
intuitively places a lower value on the sale object, and vice
versa. Qualitatively speaking, this formulation of the private
value also captures different measures of fairness depending
on the state of the network. Consider a network with two
weak users A and B with the same desired rate, and one
helper. We now illustrate the tradeoff in fairness with two
simple examples, assuming αi = 1 ∀i.
Example 1: A and B have an equally poor direct link to the
BS such that γA,BS = γB,BS . If A has a better link to the
helper, then A wins the auction by virtue of having the highest
bid. This outcome is equivalent to an opportunistic scheduling
that would also take place if (a) was set as the private value.
Example 2: A and B have an equally strong link to the
helper such that γA,PH = γB,PH . If B has a weaker link to the
BS, then B wins the auction due to a greater private value. This
case now corresponds to a max-min fair scheduling, since if
A was awarded cooperation, the minimum system rate RB =
RB,BS achieved by the loser would be lower (as RB,BS <
RA,BS).
In a larger network with more weak users and multiple
helpers interacting over multiple bidding intervals, the net
effect of the private value based on (b) would tend towards a
max-min fair outcome, since the weakest users have a greater
chance of winning. Note that although users with very strong
channels to the helper and a good channel to the BS will also
have a large private value, the probability of their being in
outage and participating in the auction game is low. While
opportunistic, max-min, and proportionally fair scheduling
algorithms have been widely discussed for non-cooperative
centralized wireless networks, fairness measures in cooperative
and ad hoc networks have largely focused on energy efficiency
[32] or coalitional game theory [33].
Furthermore, γi,PH and γi,BS are i.i.d exponential ran-
dom variables with rate parameters 1/Γi,PH and 1/Γi,BS ,
respectively. Therefore, Vi = γi,PHαi has the probability density
function (pdf) fVi (vi) = αifγi,PH (αivi).
Let λi = Γi,PH + Γi,BS . Utilizing the fact that the density
of the sum of two independent random variables is equal to
the convolution of their densities, we obtain the private value
pdf fXi (xi) as
fXi (xi) = αifγi,PH (αixi) ∗ fγi,BS (−xi) (5)
=
αi
λi
{
e
− 1
Γi,PH
αixi
xi > 0
e
1
Γi,BS
αixi
xi < 0.
(6)
The pdf in (6) simplifies to the Laplace distribution for the
special case 1/Γi,PH = 1/Γi,BS . The corresponding private
value cumulative distribution function (cdf) FXi (xi) is given
6by
FXi (xi) =
1
λi
{
λi − Γi,PH · e−
1
Γi,PH
αixi
xi > 0
Γi,BS · e
1
Γi,BS
αixi
xi < 0.
(7)
We can then define the payoff for the ith user under second-
price rules as
Πi ,


γi,PH/αi − γi,BS︸ ︷︷ ︸
value
− max
j 6=i
bj︸ ︷︷ ︸
payment
if bi > max
j 6=i
bj,
0 otherwise,
(8)
where the monetary unit of payoffs, values, and bids is in
terms of SNR.
A. Equilibrium Strategy and Revenue
We first define the pure-strategy best-response correspon-
dence for bidder i in the single-stage second-price auction
game as BRsi = arg max
bi∈Si
Πi (bi,b−i), ∀ B˜ = {bi,b−i} ∈ S,
∀ i ∈ N , where the superscript s indicates the single-
stage auction game, and the subscript i denotes bidder in-
dex. The symmetric equilibrium strategy is a joint strategy
B = (BRs1, . . . , BRsN ) such that no player can increase their
payoff by unilaterally deviating to another strategy, and it is
symmetric, all players adopt the same strategy.
We state some general characteristics of best-response cor-
respondence strategies BRi
(
xi, Nˆa(i)
)
in Proposition 1, with
the superscript s suppressed for convenience.
Proposition 1: A best-response strategy in equilibrium must
have the following characteristics: (a) BRi
(
xi 6 0, Nˆa(i)
)
=
0; (b) BRi
(
xi, Nˆa(i)
)
is non-decreasing with respect to xi,
and (c) the best reply correspondence BRi for a user of type(
Xi = xi, Nˆa(i) = Na
)
is BRi = bi (xi) = xi.
Proof : In brief, (a) follows from boundary conditions to
ensure that payoffs remain non-negative. (b) ensures that
bidders with higher types bid higher and have a greater
probability of winning. For (c), standard arguments as in [24,
Section 3.2.2] show that it is irrational to either over-bid or
under-bid with respect to one’s private value regardless of rival
uncertainty. 
Equilibrium strategies are of interest in any multi-user game
since the existence of Nash equilibria (NE) is usually a desir-
able outcome. The common method of proving the existence
of NE is by invoking the classical Kakutani or Debreu-Fan-
Glicksburg fixed-point theorems [29],[31]. However, in order
to apply these well-known methods, the user payoff functions
must be continuous, as in [21], where the user payoff was
equated to the channel realization and therefore the Kakutani
theorem was applicable. However, in the proposed auction
game user payoffs are clearly discontinuous, as seen from (8).
Therefore, we invoke the Dasgupta-Maskin existence theorem
for NE in games with discontinuous payoffs [34].
Theorem 1: A pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium exists for
the proposed N-bidder second-price auction game Ω =
[N ,Si,Πi]i∈N under rival uncertainty with the best-response
correspondence function given in Proposition 1.
Proof : From Proposition 1, since the best-response bidding
strategy is to bid the private value itself, each Euclidean
strategy subspace of valid bids Si is a non-empty and convex
set, and compact since it is closed and bounded. Therefore the
overall strategy space S is the convex product of convex sets.
The user payoff function Πi in (8) is concave (i.e., convex
cap) since it is a sum of two concave functions (the first term
is bi which is concave in itself, and the second term is concave
since the maximizer function is convex), which in turn implies
quasi-concavity. Πi is upper semi-continuous, which can be
shown by contradiction, as in [35, pg. 38, Lemma 5]. Define
Π∗i (b−i) ≡ max
bi
Πi (bi,b−i). For a given bi, Π∗i (b−i) is a
constant maximum value when it is non-zero and is continuous
over bi, thus, Πi has a continuous maximum. Therefore, the
Dasgupta-Maskin conditions are satisfied, and the existence of
a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium is guaranteed. 
Proposition 2: The Nash equilibrium described above is the
unique, symmetric, and efficient equilibrium of the proposed
ACOPS game.
Proof : As described earlier, the ACOPS game conforms to a
standard sealed-bid auction with symmetric bidding functions
and private value distributions, independent values, payoffs
that are increasing with value, and risk neutrality. Therefore,
we can apply well-known results from the literature that
guarantee the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium of
Theorem 1 when Na ≥ 2, e.g., [36, Theorem 3] and [37].
Furthermore, ties between bidders will almost surely not occur,
since different users will experience different channels and
therefore different private values with probability 1. Therefore,
this equilibrium outcome is also efficient or Pareto optimal,
since from (8) it is easy to see that the bidder with the highest
private value always places the highest bid and accordingly
wins the auction [24]. 
We now calculate the revenue generated by the potential
helper, keeping in mind that bids as well as payments are
non-zero only for weak users with positive private values. As
shown in Section VI, the revenue obtained from ACOPS is
the key parameter that stimulates cooperation in the network.
Theorem 2: The revenue Rev (Ωs) accrued to the potential
helper from the single-object auction game Ωs with rival
uncertainty and Na actual bidders under both first-price and
second-price rules is given by
Rev (Ωs) =
N∑
n=1
{
(−1)n−2
(
Γ1,PH
λ 1
)2n
(Γ2,PH)
n
(λ2)
n−1
×
(
n−2∑
k=0
C
(n−2)
(k)
1
(n− k − 1)2
)}
, (9)
where C(y)(x) is the binomial coefficient.
Proof : The proof is shown in the appendix.
7B. Outage Probability
Theorem 3: The single-partner ACOPS outage probability
for weak user 1 with target rate D1 is
P sout (D1) ≥
[
1− exp
(
−2
D1 − 1
Γ1,BS
)]
(1−Ψ1)
+
[
1− exp
(
−2
D1/2 − 1
Γ1,PH
)]
Ψ1, (10)
where Ψ1 ,
N∑
n=1
1
n
(
Γ1,PH
Γ1,PH+Γ1,BS
)2n
.
Proof : Assume weak user 1 places a bid and seeks a total
rate R1 as (3). As before, define Uw1 as the event that user 1
wins the auction, and U l1 as the complementary event that user
1 loses the auction. Therefore, the expected outage probability
for user 1 with a target rate D1 is
P sout (D1) = Pr ([C (γ1,PH) + C (γ1,BS)] < D1) · Pr (Uw1 )
+ Pr (C (γ1,BS) < D1) · Pr ((Uw1 )c) (11)
> Pr (2C (γ1,PH) < D1) · Pr (Uw1 )
+ Pr (C (γ1,BS) < D1) · Pr
(
U1l
)
. (12)
User 1’s winning probability is
Pr (Uw1 ) = Pr (U
w
1 | X1 > 0) · Pr (X1 > 0)
+ Pr (Uw1 | X1 < 0) · Pr (X1 < 0) , (13)
where Pr (Uw1 | X1 > 0) is equivalent to (28). Since a
weak user places a non-zero bid only for positive values,
Pr (Uw1 | X1 < 0) ≈ 0. Therefore, from (27) and (28),
Pr (Uw1 ) =
N∑
n=1
Pr (Na = n) Pr (U
w
1 | Na = n) Pr (X1 > 0)
(14)
=
N∑
n=1
1
n
(
Γ1,PH
Γ1,PH + Γ1,BS
)2n
. (15)
Applying (2) and (15) to (12) leads to (10). 
V. MULTIPLE-PARTNER SELECTION
We now examine multiple partner-selection by a potential
helper capable of assisting more than one weak user at the
same time. Applications of such an auction include a coop-
erative OFDM system [25]–[27], where the potential helper
auctions different sub-carriers to different weak users, and a
coded cooperation system with multiple simultaneous partners
each with a certain block of relayed redundant code-symbols.
The rest of this section examines multiple-partner selection
in a cooperative OFDM context. The conditions of private
values and rival uncertainty outlined in Section III, and best-
reply strategies of Proposition 1 are assumed to hold for the
multiple-object auction as well. Let the number of subcarriers
offered for cooperation by the potential helper be K˜ whereas
user i desires Ki subcarriers to avoid outage, and define
βi = Ki
/
K˜ . Utilizing the concept of marginal opportunity
cost from Section IV, the value of subcarrier k for weak user i
is defined as Xki,PH = γki,PH/βk − γki,BS , i.e., the (weighted)
difference in SNR between subcarrier k on the helper-user
channel and subcarrier k on the direct-to-BS channel. However,
for simplicity we assume βi = 1 ∀i in the remainder of this
work.
In a typical system, the number of shared subcarriers is
likely to be much greater than the number of partners, e.g.,
a potential helper with K˜ = 128 subcarriers available for
cooperation and five weak users seeking the use of these
subcarriers.
A. Multiple-Object Auction Formats for Multiple Subcarriers
We now list the different multiple-object auction formats
available to the potential helper:
• A series of separate single-object auctions held for each
individual subcarrier in turn, resulting in K˜ separate
auctions.
• A naive multiple-object auction, where all subcarriers are
sold as separate objects in a single auction.
• A pure bundle auction, where all subcarriers are grouped
together into a single package.
• A mixed bundle auction, where subcarriers are grouped
into multiple packages of varying size.
As an example, consider the simplest format: the naive
multiple-object auction, which is a special case of the mixed
bundle auction with one subcarrier per bundle. Under the naive
multiple-object auction, each weak user obtains the helper-user
subcarrier SNR values
[
γ1i,PH , . . . , γ
K˜
i,PH
]
and then submits
a bid vector
[
b1i , . . . , b
K˜
i
]
for all K˜ subcarriers. After the K˜
winning bids out of K˜Na total bids have been determined,
the payment made for each subcarrier is the second-highest
bid placed on that particular subcarrier. The expected payoff
for each bidder is Πi =
∑K˜
j=1 pi (j)
[
x
(j)
i −max
k 6=i
b
(j)
k
]
, where
pi (j) represents the probability of winning the jth subcarrier.
It is apparent that the naive auction format has a prohibitive
feedback overhead as the number of subcarriers or bidders
increases, therefore we turn to bundled auctions in the sequel.
We first examine the revenue superiority of bundled auctions
over the separate and naive auction formats.
Proposition 3: For large inter-user SNRs, the distribution of
the private value of a bundle is approximated by the density
function
f (n) (y) =
(
1
Γi,PH
)n
yn−1
(n− 1)!e
− 1
Γi,PH
y
. (16)
Proof : Denote random variable Y (n) as the sum of n private
values, i.e., Y (n) =
∑n
j=1Xj . We first obtain the pdf f (n) (y)
of the sum of private values for a bundle of size n. If the
difference between helper-user and direct-to-BS SNR for any
user is large enough (e.g., greater than 10 dB), the private
value pdf can be approximated by the one-sided density for
xi > 0 in (6). Consequently, f (n) (y) is the n-fold convolution
of the individual private value density functions. Denoting the
Laplace transform as L{·}, we have
L
{
f (n) (y)
}
=
[
1
Γi,PH + Γi,BS
· 1
s+ (1/Γi,PH)
]n
, (17)
8where s is the complex argument of the Laplace transform. Ap-
plying the inverse Laplace transformation [38, Eqn. 17.13.9]
and normalizing to ensure unit integral, we obtain (16). 
Next, we conjecture that a revenue-maximizing potential
helper prefers a pure bundle auction for allocation of all
subcarriers to separate single-object subcarrier auctions or the
naive multiple-object auction, as long as the number of bidders
Na is less than a threshold N∗a . For exactly two bidders, an
elegant proof is given in [39]. For the case of more than
two buyers, the second-price pure-bundle auction is revenue-
superior to any efficient auction, if the expectation of the
second highest sum of valuations is larger than the sum of
the expectations of the second highest valuations, i.e.,
E
[
2nd highest sum of values
]
>
Na∑
i
E
[
2nd highest user i value
]
.
(18)
The pdf of the second-highest sum of values can be obtained
from (16) by using the property of order statistics [24].
Cumbersome integrals obtained for both sides of (18) were
numerically evaluated, and we observe that for the given
bundle value distribution, N∗a = 7.
B. Mixed-Bundle Auction
Having established that a revenue-maximizing potential
helper strictly prefers a bundle multiple-object auction up to
a moderate number of bidders, we now examine how to adapt
the multiple-object auction to our cooperative OFDM network.
To simplify the process, we propose a mixed bundle auction
format in which the set of all subcarriers is divided into subsets
or bundles. Each bundle is now treated as a single sale object.
Based upon the results of [40, Theorem 2], we assume that
the subcarrier mixed-bundle auction offers a revenue at least as
great as the pure-bundle auction. More importantly, the mixed
bundle auction allows multiple simultaneous cooperative part-
ners since all subcarriers are not necessarily allotted to a single
bidder. The bundle auction contention and allocation process
in a cooperative OFDM context is shown in Fig. 2(b).
In the mixed-bundle auction, the surplus bandwidth of
the potential helper is divided into K bundles, which are
simultaneously awarded to r 6 Na bidders offering the K
highest bids by using a multiple-object auction as follows:
Let the K˜ individual subcarriers be grouped into K bundles
H(1), . . . , H(K), with the cardinality of each bundle being
ck =
∣∣H(k)∣∣. The value of the bundle is assumed to be
additive, i.e., the value of the bundle to a particular bidder
is the sum of the values of the constituent subcarriers. The
private-value vector for user i is now YBi =
[
Y 1i , . . . , Y
K
i
]
,
where the superscript B denotes the bundle auction, and the
value of bundle k is Y ki =
∑ck
j=iX
(j)
i . Therefore, in the
bundle auction, a group of subcarriers are allocated together
to the winning bidder(s).
The optimal distribution of subcarriers within bundles that
maximizes revenue requires a combinatorial search by the
helper, which implies prohibitive complexity as K increases.
Suboptimal bundling algorithms that guarantee a revenue at
least half that of the optimal partitioning are available in the
literature [41]. However, to reduce complexity as well as the
amount of signaling overhead even further, we assume the
helper sets the size of each bundle to K˜/Na, which is shown
to provide a revenue close to that of [41].
Theorem 4: The revenue accrued to the potential helper
under a mixed-bundle multiple-subcarrier auction game with
rival uncertainty is
Rev
(
ΩB
)
=
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
1
N
·EY k
1
[
Gn−1
Y k
2
(
Y k1
)] · EY k
2
[
Y k2 G
n−2
Y k
3
(
Y k2
)]
,
(19)
where GY k
i
(y) is the cumulative distribution function of the
kth bundle value Y ki equal to
GY k
i
(y) =
1
(Γi,PH)
ck
[
1
(1/Γi,PH)
ck−1 −
(
e
1
Γi,PH
y
)
×
ck−1∑
m=0
1
m!
ym
(1/Γi,PH)
ck−m
]
. (20)
Proof : The cdf GY k
i
(y) of the bundle value Y ki is obtained
by integrating (16) using [38, Eqn. 3.351.1]. Each bundle can
be treated as a single-object with accrued revenue as derived in
(34) of Theorem 2 and assuming Pr (Na = n) = 1N . Summing
over all K bundles provides (19). 
Theorem 5: The outage probability for weak user i in the
bundled multiple-subcarrier auction under rival uncertainty is
PBout (D1) ≈
1
2

1 + erf

D1 − µc
(
K˜
)
√
2σc
(
K˜
)



 · (1−Θi (1))
+
1
2

1 + erf

D1 − µc
(
K˜ + c1
)
√
2σc
(
K˜ + c1
)



 · (Θi (1)) ,
(21)
where Θi (1) , 1N
N∑
n=1
EY 1
1
[
Gn−1
Y 1
2
(
Y 11
)]
, µc, σc are defined
in (26), and erf (x) is the error function.
Proof : Define bundle winning probability Θi (K) =
Pr (user i wins K bundles). For the OFDM capacity of (4),
the multiple-partner ACOPS outage probability can be ex-
pressed as
PBout (Di) = Pr
(
C˜i,BS
(
K˜
)
< Di
)
·Θi (0)
+ Pr
([
C˜i,BS
(
K˜
)
+ C˜i,PH (c1)
]
< Di
)
·Θi (1)
. . . + Pr
([
C˜i,BS
(
K˜
)
+ C˜i,PH
(∑K
i=1
ci
)]
< Di
)
× Θi (K) . (22)
Neglecting the probability of user i winning multiple bundles,
we have
PBout (Di) ≤ Pr
(
C˜i,BS
(
K˜
)
< Di
)
(1−Θi (1))
+Pr
([
C˜i,BS
(
K˜
)
+ C˜i,PH (c1)
]
< Di
)
Θi (1) .23)
Following (28), the probability of user 1 winning bundle Y ki
9is
Θ1 (1) =
N∑
n=1
Pr (Na = n) ·Θ1 (1|Na = n) (24)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
EY 1
1
[
Gn−1
Y 1
2
(
Y 11
)]
. (25)
For a finite J , the instantaneous OFDM sum capacity C˜i,j (J)
can be approximated by a normal random variable with mean
µc (J) and variance σ2c (J) [42]:
µc (J) = − J
ln 2
e
(
1/γ0
)
Ei
(
− 1
γ0
)
,
σ2c (J) = J
[
var (C1) + 2
J∑
k=1
cov (C1, Ck)
]
, (26)
where Ei (x) =
x∫
−∞
et
t dt is the exponential integral,
var (C1) is the variance, and cov (Ck, Ck+1) is the co-
variance of the instantaneous subchannel capacity random
variables. From the cdf of the normal distribution, we
have Pr
(
C˜i,BS
(
K˜
)
< Di
)
= 12
(
1 + erf
(
Di−µc(K˜)√
2σc(K˜)
))
,
where erf (x) is the error function. Substituting into (23), we
obtain (21). 
We conclude this section with some remarks on the savings
in communication overhead afforded by ACOPS. A fully cen-
tralized partner-allocation mechanism requires the availability
of complete CSI for all users at the central controller (BS or
network access point), which is prohibitive to implement in
bandwidth-limited systems. In fact, in networks with asym-
metric user channels, reliable CSI reporting to the central
controller may not be possible at all for users in a deep
fade. The amount of feedback of channel state information
(CSI) required for ACOPS will be considerably lower, since
users are assumed to be unaware of the CSI of all other
users and the partner selection is localized in nature. For
the single-object auction process, the amount of unquantized
signaling overhead per user (combining rate requests and
bids sent to the potential helper) in bits is calculated to be
(log2 q1 + log2 b1), where b1, q1 are the feedback transmitted
by user 1 and are considered to be the same for all users.
The global feedback required for the single partner, naive
multiple-object auction, bundled multiple-object auction, and
centralized multiple-partner selection are listed in Table II.
TABLE II
GLOBAL SIGNALING OVERHEAD (BITS)
Single partner, ACOPS N log
2
q1 +Na log2 b1
Single partner, centralized N log
2
γ1,BS +N ! log2 γ1,j
Multiple partner (naive), ACOPS N log
2
q1 + log2Nab
k
1
K˜
Multiple partner (bundled), ACOPS N log
2
q1 + log2Nab
k
1
K
Multiple partner, centralized K˜
(
N log
2
γ1,BS +N ! log2 γ1,j
)
VI. DISCUSSION
The preceding sections have thus far considered one-hop
relaying in single stage auctions where the winning bidders are
assumed to have sufficient funds to pay the required price. The
extension of ACOPS to multi-hop relaying can be achieved
using auctions with a resale market, where buyers of goods
are free to resell them in a subsequent auction within the same
cooperation interval. Next, we consider the more involved
scenarios of multiple-stage (sequential) ACOPS, and auctions
with more than one potential helper.
A. Multiple Stage ACOPS
The analysis of repeated auctions over successive time peri-
ods necessitates introduction of sequential auction games with
budget constraints. First and second-price single-stage auctions
with budget constraints are well studied in the literature [24],
however the revenue equivalence principle no longer holds.
Sequential single-object auctions with budget constraints is
an evolving field of auction theory. Equilibrium strategies
have been derived for certain specialized cases such as finite-
horizon sequential auctions with an identical good sold in
every stage by a fixed seller to budget-constrained bidders
without rival uncertainty. Furthermore, most previous studies
assume that bidders have utility for only a single unit, i.e., they
drop out after winning a particular stage. The conventional
modeling of budget constraints also merits mention: budget
constraints are either assumed to be a pre-specified constant,
or a random variable with a realization revealed to the bidder
at every stage [24].
In the context of partner selection in dynamic wireless net-
works, our general auction scenario differs in virtually every
aspect: non-identical sale objects in successive stages due to
changing channel conditions, private values and budgets, infi-
nite time horizon, dynamic entry/exit of users, and absence of a
fixed seller. It is tempting to consider simplifying assumptions
in ACOPS in order to make the problem more tractable. For
example, assuming budgets are publicly known as in [43]
makes it easier for bidders to plan future strategies based on
the current bids of competitors. However, the fundamentally
unique aspect of our ACOPS game is the fact that users can
act as either a bidder or a seller in a given stage, and their
budget evolves over time corresponding to their actions and
the outcomes of past stages. To our best knowledge, such a
sequential auction scenario has yet to be studied by the auction
theory community.
Let us assume that in the sequential version of ACOPS,
each user attempts to minimize the number of stages in which
it suffers from outage over the duration of its presence in the
network. The channel conditions and therefore private values
of each user are revealed to them in a causal manner at
the beginning of every stage. However, the residual budget
from the conclusion of a stage carries over to the next one.
Therefore, at stage k, user i possesses private information
(xi(k), wi(k)), where wi(k) is the available budget.
We first establish that it is always beneficial for a strong
user to act as a potential helper. Consider two strong users
A and B that enter the game at stage k with an identical
initial budget constraint and face N weak users. A is willing
to act as a potential helper at stage k, whereas B abstains from
cooperating with weak users. Since both users are ‘strong’,
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they possess spare resources by definition, therefore being a
helper does not affect A’s QoS at the very least. Let us assume
that from stage k+1 onwards, A and B find themselves in the
category of weak users and both begin to bid for cooperation.
Now, serving as a helper in stage k enables A to participate
in η additional forthcoming stages after the point at which B
exhausts its budget, where η can be computed as the ratio of
A’s expected revenue in stage k to A’s expected payments in
stages k + 1, k + 2, . . . using Theorem 2.
We assume that a reasonable strategy for a user in sequential
ACOPS is as follows: if ‘strong’, then act as a helper; if
‘weak’, then bid the minimum of his private value and budget
in each stage, which is optimal for the single-stage auction
game. A rigorous proof of the optimality of this strategy is
beyond the scope of this paper. Alternatively, the bidders may
adopt a linear bidding function of the form ci(k)xi(k) as
proposed in [21], where the constant ci(k) is chosen to satisfy
the budget constraint wi(k) at that stage (i.e., the entire budget
is placed as a bid regardless of the private value). Intuitively,
an aggressive bidding strategy of this kind maximizes the
probability of winning a particular stage but risks a negative
payoff in that stage, and also leads to a faster depletion of
the budget. We compare these two strategies by means of
simulation in the next section.
A multi-stage multiple-object auction game with budget
constraints is again an open problem in auction theory re-
search, as is the existence and closed-form expressions for
equilibria in multiple-object auctions with non-identical goods.
B. Multiple Helpers
The situation where one weak user can choose between two
or more potential helpers in a stage can be studied by using
simultaneous auction models [44]. In the absence of budget
constraints, it is known that the optimal strategy for a bidder
is to place bids with all available sellers. For the general multi-
stage scenario with budget constraints, the game evolves into a
dynamic market game with competition between the multiple
sellers at one level, and competition among the bidders as
before. Such games have been investigated in the context of
dynamic spectrum allocation in wireless networks [45], for
example.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
The following representative examples are used for simu-
lation purposes. Users are assumed to be quasi-static with a
mobile velocity of 3 km/hr to capture the effect of prolonged
shadowing. We refer to max SNR partner selection as partner
selection based upon highest instantaneous helper-user SNR
γi,PH . The cooperative OFDM system is set to K˜ = 128
subcarriers. For all centralized schemes considered, the BS
has complete CSI to and between all users, and assigns
partners either on a max-min criterion that tries to maximize
the lowest user throughput, or an opportunistic throughput-
maximizing criterion [11]. All ACOPS performance results are
those achieved at the unique symmetric equilibrium described
in previous sections.
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Fig. 3. Single-object auction game: average weak-user outage probability
versus SNR for no cooperation, random selection, maximum instantaneous
SNR, auction-theoretic, and centralized-partner selection for N = 5 weak
users.
For Fig. 3, the average weak user-to-helper SNR is fixed as
γi,PH = 10 dB, while the direct-link SNR is varied between
7 dB to -20 dB. We compare the average weak-user outage
probability achieved by no cooperation, random selection,
simulated and analytical single-object ACOPS, and centralized
max-min partner selection with N = 5 weak users and target
rate Di = 10b/s. The increasing values of the private value
on the abscissa correspond to decreasing values of γi,BS . It
is observed that in this scenario ACOPS closely mimics the
centralized max-min scheduler, which agrees with intuition.
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Fig. 4. Single-object auction game: average weak-user outage probability
versus SNR for no cooperation, random selection, maximum instantaneous
SNR, auction-theoretic, and centralized-partner selection for N = 5 weak
users.
Next, in Fig. 4 the average direct-link SNR is fixed as
γi,BS = 0 dB, and the weak user-helper SNR is varied
between 7 dB to -20 dB. The increasing values of the private
value on the abscissa now correspond to increasing values of
γi,PH . It is observed that the ACOPS mechanism performs
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close to the opportunistic max-SNR selection in the worst
direct-to-BS SNR regime due to the choice of the private
value expression for Xi, while the two curves converge in
the high SNR regime. In addition, ACOPS outage probability
performance is close to the centralized version even without
CSI knowledge of all users.
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Fig. 5. Expected revenue accrued by the potential helper when using
the single-stage single-partner first-price and second-price and second-price
bundled sealed-bid auctions with respect to user-helper SNR.
Fig. 5 displays the seller revenue obtained from the first-
price and second-price single-object and second-price bundled
auctions as the number of bidders increases. The helper-BS
link SNR γPH,BS is fixed at 20 dB, and γi,BS = 0 dB.
For the single-object ACOPS, the simulated and analytical
revenue curves are in agreement with theoretical predictions
of revenue equivalence. For the bundled ACOPS, the proposed
low-complexity bundling partition offers 70% of the sub-
optimal bundling algorithm previously proposed in [41].
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Fig. 6. Average outage probability for bundle multiple partner selection using
ACOPS, centralized-selection, and no cooperation, for number of partners r
= 2 and 4, 128 OFDM subcarriers. Total number of weak users N = 10.
Fig. 6 displays the average weak user outage probability
achieved by no cooperation, multiple-object bundle ACOPS
and fully centralized multiple-partner selection with respect to
decreasing desired rates, and N = 10 weak users. The surplus
rate Rc of the potential helper is set to be able to accommodate
r = 2 and 4 simultaneous partners, respectively. Once again, it
is observed that the ACOPS outage probability for r = 2 and 4
is close to the corresponding centralized outage performance.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
100
102
104
106
108
1010
Number of Bidders N
a
To
ta
l S
ig
na
lin
g 
O
ve
rh
ea
d 
in
 B
its
 
 
Single−Partner ACOPS
Single−Partner Centralized
Multiple−Partner Centralized
Multiple−Partner Naive
Multiple−Partner Mixed Bundle
Fig. 7. Total feedback bits required at potential helper versus number of weak
users under single-object ACOPS, naive and bundled multiple-object ACOPS
with 512 subcarriers, and feedback bits required at BS under centralized single
and multiple-partner selection.
Fig. 7 shows the signaling overhead in bits under single-
object and multiple-object (naive and bundle formats) ACOPS,
and a BS under centralized single and multiple partner selec-
tion versus number of weak users N . For the bundle multiple-
object auction, the number of bundles K is equated to the
number of bidding weak users N for simplicity. The ACOPS
mechanism requires significantly reduced signaling overhead
in both single and multiple-partner scenarios, e.g., by a factor
of 9 for single-partner ACOPS versus centralized selection
with N = 5 weak users.
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Fig. 8. Cumulative fraction of stages in outage for multi-stage single-partner
ACOPS. Di = 6 (bits/s/Hz) ∀i, with 6 total users in the network per stage.
Finally, Fig. 8 displays the cumulative fraction of stages
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in outage for multi-stage single-partner ACOPS over 100
successive stages. The initial budget constraint for all users
is set to w0 = 5000. The legends “Conservative Bid”
and “Aggressive Bid” denote the strategies of bidding as
bi (xi(k), wi(k)) = min (xi(k), wi(k)) versus spending the
entire budget per stage as bi (xi(k), wi(k)) = wi(k), respec-
tively, while always serving as a potential helper when in a
strong state in both cases. The legend “No Help” corresponds
to the case where a user never acts as a helper during his
strong state, and bids conservatively when in a weak state. The
channel realizations are independent across users and stages,
while budgets carry over. The required data rate is set such
that users are in outage roughly 70% of the time without any
cooperation. We observe that the users that do not assist others
exhaust their budget very quickly and thereafter are unable to
participate in auctions when weak. The conservative bidding
strategy outperforms the aggressive strategy by allowing the
users to bid successfully in a greater number of auction stages.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A decentralized and low-complexity cooperative partner-
selection scheme based on auction theory was developed and
analyzed for dynamic ad hoc networks. Best-response strate-
gies were characterized for the second-price sealed-bid auction
game with uncertainty in the number of bidders, followed
by the multiple-object bundle auction game. The proposed
cooperative communication protocol with minimum network
condition information was shown to achieve outage perfor-
mance close to a centralized partner-selection scheme with
complete CSI, even under adverse channel conditions. The
auction-theoretic partner-selection strategy was also shown to
significantly reduce the signaling overhead involved in config-
uring cooperative communications, which will translate into
improved bandwidth and power efficiency for mobile users.
Although the present study featured a cooperative network
with a central transceiver as the final destination, the proposed
partner-selection scheme can be extended to accommodate ad
hoc networks with multiple transmitter-receiver pairs.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof : Consider ACOPS under second-price auction rules.
Let Pr (Na = n) be the probability of n actual bidders
with positive private values, and consider bidder 1 with bid
b1 (x1) = x1, x1 > 0. Given that the n private values are i.i.d
with distribution FXi , we have
Pr (Na = n) =
n∏
i=1
(1− FXi (0)) =
(
Γ1,PH
Γ1,PH + Γ1,BS
)n
.
(27)
Define Uw1 as the event that bidder 1 wins the auction, and U l1
as the complementary event that bidder 1 loses the auction.
The probability that bidder 1 possesses the highest bid is given
by
Pr (Uw1 ) =
N∑
n=1
Pr (Na = n) Pr (U
w
1 | Na = n) . (28)
Now, the winning probability for bidder 1 conditioned upon
the number of actual bidders is
Pr (Uw1 | Na = n) = Pr (X2 ≤ X1, . . . , Xn ≤ X1 | Na = n)
(29)
=
∞∫
0
[FX2 (x1)]
n−1 fX1 (x1)dx1 = EX1
[
Fn−1X2 (X1)
]
.
(30)
The expected revenue for the seller from bidder 1 alone
is derived next. Assuming X2 = max
j,j 6=1
Xj , the conditional
payment made by winning bidder 1, E [Rev (Ωs) | Na = n],
can be written as
EX2
[
2nd highest bid | bidder 2 is the 2nd highest bidder ]
(31)
= EX2
[
2nd highest bid | Xi=3,...,n ≤ X2, X1 > X2, Na = n
]
· Pr (Uw1 | Na = n) (32)
= EX2
[
X2F
n−2
X3
(X2)
]
Pr (Uw1 | Na = n) . (33)
Therefore, using (30) and (33), the expected revenue at the
potential helper averaged over all actual bidders is
Rev (Ωs) =
N∑
n=1
{
Pr (Na = n) · nEX1
[
Fn−1X2 (X1)
]
· EX2
[
X2F
n−2
X3
(X2)
]}
. (34)
Under the i.i.d private value assumption, using FX2 = FX1
and [38, Eqn. 3.312.1], we obtain EX1
[
Fn−1X2 (X1)
]
=
An1 · β (1, n), where Ai = Γi,PHΓi,PH+Γi,BS , and β (a, b) =∫ 1
0 t
a−1 (1− t)b−1 dt is the beta function. Since the beta
function has integer arguments, it can be simplified to
β (1, n) = (n−1)!n! =
1
n . Similarly, EX2
[
X2F
n−2
X3
(X2)
]
=
(−1)n−2An−12 Γ2,PH
∑n−2
k=0 C
(n−2)
(k)
1
(n−k−1)2 , using FX3 =
FX2 and [38, Eqn. 3.432.1] with a change of variable. Substi-
tuting along with (27) into (34), we obtain the result of (9).
To show that ACOPS under first-price auction rules has the
same revenue, we invoke the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
[31], which guarantees that both auction games should provide
the same revenue even under rival uncertainty, as long as (i) a
bidder with the lowest feasible value has an expected payment
of zero, (ii) the bidder with the highest value is allocated the
object, and (iii) bidders share a private value distribution with
a monotone hazard rate λ (x) = fX(x)1−FX (x) . Conditions (i),(ii)
are satisfied by our auction model assumptions in Section
III and Proposition 1. The hazard rate of the given private
value distribution is unimodal and is monotonically increasing
(decreasing) for negative (positive) values. Therefore, the
first-price ACOPS has the same revenue as the second-price
ACOPS given by (9). 
REFERENCES
[1] G. J. Foschini and M. J. Gans, “On limits of wireless communications in
a fading environment when using multiple antennas,” Wireless Personal
Commun., vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 311-335, 1998.
[2] A. Sendonaris, E. Erkip, and B. Aazhang, “User cooperation diversity-
part I: System description,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 51, no. 11, pp.
1927-1938, Nov. 2003.
13
[3] A. Sendonaris, E. Erkip, and B. Aazhang, “User cooperation diversity-
part II: Implementation aspects and performance analysis,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 51, no. 11, pp. 1939-1948, Nov. 2003.
[4] J. N. Laneman, D. N. C. Tse, and G. W. Wornell, “Cooperative diversity in
wireless networks: efficient protocols and outage behavior,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, vol. 50, no. 12, pp. 3062-3080, Dec. 2004.
[5] A. Horst-Madsen, “Capacity bounds for cooperative diversity,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 1522-1544, Apr. 2006.
[6] T. E. Hunter and A. Nosratinia, “Diversity through coded cooperation,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., no. 2, pp. 283-289, Feb. 2006.
[7] A. Stefanov and E. Erkip, “Cooperative coding for wireless networks,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 52, no. 9, pp. 1470-1476, Sep. 2004.
[8] A. Stefanov and E. Erkip, “Cooperative space-time coding for wireless
networks,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 53, no. 11, pp. 1804-1809, Nov.
2005.
[9] Z. Lin, E. Erkip, and A. Stefanov, “Cooperative regions and partner choice
in coded cooperative systems,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 54, no. 7,
pp.1323-1334, July 2006.
[10] Z. Zhang, Y. Chen, P. Qiu, and P. Cheng, “Optimal partner selection
strategies in wireless cooperative networks with fixed and variable trans-
mit power,” in Proc. IEEE WCNC, pp. 4080-4084, Mar. 2007.
[11] A. Nosratinia and T. E. Hunter, “Grouping and partner selection in
cooperative wireless networks,” IEEE J. Selected Areas Commun., vol.
25, no. 2, pp. 369-378, Feb. 2007.
[12] A. Ibrahim, A. K. Sadek, W. Su, and K. J. Ray Liu, “Cooperative
communications with relay-selection: When to cooperate and whom to
cooperate with?” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 2814-
2827, July 2008.
[13] V. Mahinthan, L. Cai, J. W. Mark, and X. Shen, “Partner selection
based on optimal power allocation in cooperative-diversity systems,”
IEEE Trans. Veh. Tech., vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 511-520, Jan. 2008.
[14] Z. Han, T. Himsoon, W. Siriwongpairat, and K. J. R. Liu, “Resource
allocation for multiuser cooperative OFDM networks: Who helps whom
and how to cooperate,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Tech., vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 2378-
2391, June 2009.
[15] U. Saraydar, N. Mandayam, and D. J. Goodman, “Efficient power control
via pricing in wireless data networks,” IEEE J. Selected Areas Commun.,
vol. 50, no. 2, Feb. 2002.
[16] O. Illeri, S. Mau, and N. Mandayam, “Pricing for enabling forwarding
in self-configuring ad hoc networks,” IEEE J. Selected Areas Commun.,
vol. 23, no. 1, Jan. 2005.
[17] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Market-equilibrium, competitive, and coop-
erative pricing for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: Analysis
and comparison,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 11, pp.
4273-4283, Nov. 2008.
[18] Y. Chen and S. Kishore, “A game theoretic analysis of cooperative
communications,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 1941-
1951, May 2008.
[19] S. Mathur, L. Sankar, and N. B. Mandayam, “Coalitions in cooperative
wireless networks,” IEEE J. Selected Areas Commun., vol. 26, no. 7, pp.
1104-1115, Sep. 2008.
[20] P. Maille, “Auctioning for downlink transmission power in CDMA
cellular systems,” in Proc. 7th ACM Int. Symp. on Mod., Anal. and Sim.
of Wireless and Mobile Syst., pp. 293-296, 2004.
[21] J. Sun, E. Modiano, and Z. Lizhong, “Wireless channel allocation using
an auction algorithm,” IEEE J. Selected Areas Commun., vol. 24, no. 5,
pp. 1085-1096, May 2006.
[22] J. Huang, Z. Han, M. Chiang, and H. V. Poor, “Auction-based distributed
resource allocation for cooperation transmission in wireless networks,”
Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, pp. 4807-4812, Nov. 2007.
[23] S. Han and Y. Han, “A competitive fair subchannel allocation for
OFDMA system using an auction algorithm,” Proc. IEEE 66th Vehicular
Tech. Conf., pp. 1787-1791, Oct. 2007.
[24] V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2002.
[25] O. Shin, A. Chan, H.T. Kung, and V. Tarokh, “Design of an OFDM
cooperative diversity system,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Tech., vol. 56, no. 4, pp.
2203-2215, July 2007.
[26] L. Weng and R. D. Murch, “Cooperation strategies and resource allo-
cations in multiuser OFDMA systems,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Tech., vol. 58,
no. 5, pp. 2331-2342, June 2009.
[27] W. Siriwongpairat, A. K. Sadek, and K. J. R. Liu, “Cooperative
communications protocol for multiuser OFDM networks,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 2430-2435, July 2008.
[28] A. Goldsmith, Wireless Communications, Cambridge University Press,
2005.
[29] R. B. Myerson, Game Theory Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University
Press, 1997.
[30] W. Nicholson and C. M. Snyder, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Princi-
ples and Extensions, South-Western College, 2007.
[31] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991.
[32] D. Michalopoulos and G. K. Karagiannidis, “PHY-layer fairness in
amplify and forward cooperative diversity systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 1073-1083, March 2008.
[33] W. Saad, Z. Han, M. Debbah, and A. Hjørungnes, “A distributed merge
and split algorithm for fair cooperation in wireless networks,” Proc. IEEE
ICC Workshop, pp. 311-315, May 2008.
[34] P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin, “The existence of equilibrium in discon-
tinuous economic games, 1: Theory,” Review of Economic Studies, LIII,
pp.1-26, 1986.
[35] A. B. Mackenzie and L. DaSilva, Game Theory for Wireless Engineers,
Morgan & Claypool, 2006.
[36] E. Maskin and J. Riley, “Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers,”
Econometrica, vol. 52, pp. 1473-1518, 1984.
[37] E. Maskin and J. Riley, “Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid
auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 45, 2003, pp. 395-409.
[38] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and
Products, Sixth Edition, Academic Press, 2000.
[39] T. Palfrey, “Bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with
incomplete information,” Econometrica, vol. 51, pp. 463-484, 1983.
[40] P. Jehiel, M. Meyer-ter-Vehn, and B. Moldovanu, “Mixed bundling
auctions,” Discussion Paper 141, Free University of Berlin, 2006.
[41] A. Ghosh, H. Nazerzadeh, and M. Sundararajan, “Computing optimal
bundles for sponsored search,” Proc. 3rd Workshop Internet and Network
Econ., pp. 576-583, 2007.
[42] A. Clark, P. J. Smith, and D. P. Taylor, “Instantaneous capacity of OFDM
on Rayleigh-fading channels,” IEEE Trans. on Inform. Theory, vol. 53,
no. 1, pp. 355-361, Jan. 2007.
[43] J. Bae, E. Beigman, R. A. Berry, M. L. Honig, and R. Vohra, “Sequential
bandwidth and power auctions for distributed spectrum sharing”, IEEE J.
Selected Areas Commun., vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1193-1203, Sep. 2008.
[44] T. Candale and S. Sen, “A comparison of bidding strategies for simulta-
neous auctions,” ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 41-48, Jan.
2006.
[45] Z. Ji and K.J.R. Liu, “Belief-assisted pricing for dynamic spectrum
allocation in wireless networks with selfish users”, Proc. IEEE SECON,
pp. 119-127, Sep. 2006.
